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We propose the notion of security-by-contract, a mobile contract that an application carries
with itself. The key idea of the framework is that a digital signature should not just certify
the origin of the code but rather bind together the code with a contract.
We provide a description of theworkﬂow for the deployment and execution ofmobile code
in the setting of security-by-contract, describe a structure for a contractual language and
propose a number of algorithms for one of the key steps in the process, the contract-policy
matching issue. We also describe the prototype for matching policies with security claims
of mobile applications that we have currently implemented.
We argue that security-by-contract would provide a semantics for digital signatures on
mobile code thus being a step in the transition from trusted code to trustworthy code.
© 2009 Published by Elsevier Inc.
1. Introduction
Mobile devices are increasingly popular and powerful. Yet, the growth in computing power of nomadic devices has not
been supported by a comparable growth in available software: on high-end mobile phones we cannot even remotely ﬁnd
the amount of third party software that was available on our old PC.
One of the reasons for this lack of applications is also the security model adopted for mobile phones. The current security
model is exempliﬁed by the JAVA MIDP 2.0 and .NET CF approach and is based on trust relationships: a mobile application
is accepted if it is digitally signed by a trusted party. The level of trust of the “trusted party” determines the privileges of the
code by essentially segregating it into appropriate trust domain.
The problemwith trust relationship, i.e. digital signatures onmobile code, is twofold. At ﬁrst we can only reject or accept
the signature. This means that inter-operability in a domain is either total or not existing: an application from a not-so-
trusted source can be denied network access, but it cannot be denied access to a speciﬁc protocol, or to a speciﬁc domain.
For example, if a payment service is available on the platform and an application for paying parking meters is loaded, the
user cannot block the application from performing large payments.
The second (and major) problem is that there is no semantics attached to the signature. The signature only tells us who is
responsible for the code. This is a problem for both code producers and consumers.
From the point of view of mobile code consumers they must essentially accept the code “as-is” without the possibility of
making informed decisions [41]. One might well trust SuperGame Inc. to provide excellent games and yet might decide to
rule out games that keep playing while the battery fells below 20%. At present such choice is not possible.
From the point of view of the code producer they produce code with unbounded liability. They cannot declare which
security actions the code will do, they only declare that the code comes from their software factory. The consequence is
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that injecting an application into the mobile market is a costly operation as SME developers must essentially convince
the operators that their code will not do anything harmful. As a result, a lot of code comes at the market uncertiﬁed or
self-certiﬁed. In other words, most code is untrusted.
Todealwith theuntrusted code themobile versionof either .NET [30] or Java [18] enablesdevices to exploit themechanism
ofpermissions. Thedrawbackofpermissions is that after assigningapermission theuserhasvery limitedcontrol overhowthe
permission is used. An application can receive a permission to send SMSmessages and then send hundreds of them invisibly
for the user. Once again the consequence is that either applications are sandboxed (and thus can do almost nothing), or the
user decided that they are trusted (and then they can do almost everything).
Such situation has essentially polarized users in two groups: the security paranoids and the technology enthusiasts. From
the former perspective2:
The policy should protect the integrity of the device, and of other applications on the device, from any application that is
loaded, i.e. sandboxing. [. . . ] If the agenda data is sensitive, then I NEVER want untrusted applications to access it. This is much
simpler than a temporal requirement that an untrusted application cannot have network access if it has looked at sensitive data.
The life of the technology enthusiasts is riskier but surely better3:
There is this nice midlet that accesses my agenda and at 7:50 pops up a window that today is the birthday of these people in
the list. [. . . ] I’m no longer the only parent who never greets my contact children’s teachers on their birthday. Look, there is also an option
to send an SMS with happy birthday to the phone numbers but that would be too expensive with my current subscription.
Unfortunately, the technology enthusiast cannot just say that access to the agenda is ﬁne provided there is no network
connection. If the permission is granted the application may do anything with the obtained information, including sending
it to a hackers’ web site in Russia. If the required permission is not granted the application becomes completely useless. We
need something beyond sandboxing.
1.1.The contribution of the paper
We propose in this paper the notion of Security-by-Contract (S×C) (as in programming-by-contract [35,7]) namely, the
digital signature should not just certify the origin of the code but rather bind together the code with a contract. Loosely
speaking, a contract contains a description of the relevant features of the application and the relevant interactions with its
host platform. A mobile platform could specify platform contractual requirements, a policy,4 which should be matched by
the application’s contract. Among the relevant features, one can list ﬁne-grained resource control (e.g. silently initiate a
phone call or send a SMS), memory usage, secure and insecure web connections, user privacy protection, conﬁdentiality of
application data, constraints on access from other applications already on the platform.
We provide here a description of the overall life-cycle of mobile code in the setting of security-by-contract, describe a
structure for a contractual language and propose a number of algorithms for one of the key steps in the process, namely the
issue of contract-policy matching.
We argue that security-by-contract would provide a semantics for digital signatures on mobile code thus being a step in
the transition from trusted code to trustworthy code.
In the next section we brieﬂy describe the basic idea of the S×C paradigm for mobile code and security policies in the
Security-By-Contract scenario. Then we discuss a concrete contractual language (Section 3) that we have used. The subse-
quent three sections describe the matching algorithm structure and its components. The software architecture and our Java
implementations are thendescribed (Section 7). A discussion of relatedwork and some conclusions end the paper (Section 8).
2. The S×C usage model
Bertrand Meyer in “The Grand Challenge of Trusted Components” at ICSE 2003, described the challenges to be met by
designers of trusted software components. A key challenge was the lack of an explicit speciﬁcation of the relevant behavior
of the components and, above all, the development of computer aided methods for checking and enforcing those explicit
speciﬁcations at run-time.
In his EIFFEL project, Meyer suggested the notion of programming-by-contract [7,22] as a way to address this problem:
software components should come with a contract described in contractual aware languages, the correctness of a program
is explicitly asserted through a contract, i.e. a claim on the behavior of single methods (pre-conditions and post-conditions)
or the whole classes.
Applications wishing to use a component developed with programming-by-contract can then match the contractual
claims by the component with their need or preferences. The trusted component is bound by the promises it makes thus
implicitly stipulating a contract with the applications that wishes to uses its services.
2 A reviewer at a leading security conference on a paper on usage control.
3 An article on the local press commenting the features of the "Andiamo" (let’s go) student software project.
4 In the sequel we will refer to policy as the security requirements on the platform side and by contract the security claims made by the mobile code.
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Fig. 1. SxC workﬂow.
In the framework of the S3MS project (www.s3ms.org), we have proposed to apply Meyer’s intuition to security claims
of mobile code. A contract is an explicit claim on the security behavior of a mobile application (playing the role of Meyer’s
trusted component) that a platform should match against its own.
Such notion ﬁlls a gap in the current arena of security mechanisms for enforcing security properties of mobile code. The
focus of run-time security monitors [13,3,20,48] is to enforce a security policy speciﬁed by the platform. The possibility that
an application can make security claims about its behavior is not considered. We thus need to monitor also applications
that are harmless. At the other side of the spectrum of security research, the proof-carrying code approach [39] produces a
“certiﬁcate”, amachine checkable proof that the object code respects a given security policy. Themost basic example is SUN’s
javac compiler: it takes a Java source code that satisﬁes a type safety policy and produces JVML code that obeys type-safety.
This approach is restricted to type-safety and does not allow the application to claim some ad-hoc security behavior: “no
http connection to Google Analytics” would be a simple claim that could not be checked with traditional language-based
approaches.
The mobile code developers are responsible to provide a description of the security behavior that their code provides.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Contract). A contract is a formal complete and correct speciﬁcation of the behavior of an application for what
concerns relevant security actions (virtual machine API Calls, Operating System Calls).
Following Meyer’s intuition, the contract has to be complete so that all operations that are security-relevant and are
used in the application should be included in the contract. Further, it should be correct in the sense that the behavioral
speciﬁcation of the security actions described in the contract should be the one actually followed in the application. In this
setting we found useful to provide both rules that describe the behavior during a single run of the application (a session)
and rules that describe properties across multiple run of the application.
At development time the mobile code developers are responsible for providing the description of the contract. Such pair
of contract and mobile code may also undergo a formal certiﬁcation process by the developer’s own company, the smart
card provider, a mobile phone operator, or any other third party for which the application has been developed. By using
suitable techniques such as static analysis [27,46], certiﬁedmonitor in-lining [19,48,9], or general theorem proving, the code
is certiﬁed to comply with the developer’s contract.
At the end of the process, the code and the security claims are sealed together with the evidence for compliance (either
a digital signature or a PCC proof [39,9]) and shipped for deployment. By signing the code and the contract together the
developer certiﬁes that the code complies with the stated claims on its security-relevant behavior.
On the other side we can see that users and mobile phone operators are interested in all codes that are deployed on their
platform to be secure according their priorities. In other words they must declare their security policy:
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Policy). A policy is a formal complete speciﬁcation of the acceptable behavior of applications to be executed
on the platform for what concerns relevant security actions (Virtual Machine API Calls, Operating System Calls).
At deployment time, the target platform follows a workﬂow similar to the one depicted in Fig. 1 (see also [49] for the
details of the software architecture). First, it checks that the evidence is correct. As we said already, such evidence can be a
trusted signature as in standardmobile applications [51] or a proof that the code satisﬁes the contract (and then one can use
PCC techniques to check it [39]).
Once we have evidence that the contract is trustworthy, the platform checks, that the claimed policy is compliant with
the policy that our platform wants to enforce. If it is, then the application can be run without further ado. This may be a
signiﬁcant saving from in-lining a securitymonitor or actually deploying a run-timemonitor in parallel with the application.
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At run-timewemight want to decide to still monitor the application. Then, we might decide to inline a number of checks
into the application so that any undesired behavior can be immediately stopped or corrected.
To give an intuitive idea of the constructs proposed in this paperwe informally describe them bymeans of rules in natural
language.Wewill formally specify the rules in Section 3. Let us consider the following examplewhichwewill use throughout
the paper.
Example 2.1. A midlet5 claims that during a single execution it will
1. only use HTTPS network connections and
2. send no SMS messages.
The platform’s policy has two rules applicable to a single run of the application:
1. the application uses only high-level (HTTP, HTTPS) network connections;
2. a maximum of ﬁve text messages can be sent by the application.
It should be intuitive that in this case the application’s contractmatches the platform’s policy. In fact, the security behavior
claimed in the application’s contract corresponds to the allowed security behavior stated in the platform’s policy.
2.1.Contract-policy matching
As we can see in Fig. 1, one of the key problems in the overall security-by-contract workﬂow is contract-policy matching
which is also a key aspect in Meyer’s programming-by-contract: given a contract that an application carries with itself and a
policy that a platform speciﬁes, is the contract compliant with the policy?
Contract-policy matching represents a common problem in the life-cycle because it must be done at all levels: both for
development and run-time operation. Intuitively, matching should succeed if and only if by executing the application on the
platform every behavior of the application that satisﬁes its contract also satisﬁes the platform’s policy. To address this issue
we need efﬁcient algorithms to match application contracts with device policies. This will be the target of Section 4.
The following example shows how matching might fail.
Example 2.2. Let us consider an application’s contract with just one rule:
• the amount of data the application can receive is bounded by 1024 kb.
The platform’s policy has one rule allowing to receive a speciﬁc amount of data.
• the amount of data an application can receive is bounded by 512 kb.
In this case, the contract-policy matching must fail, since the application can receive more data than the one allowed by the
mobile platform.
3. A concrete contract representation
If a contract represents the security behavior of an application the temptation would be to make such contractual claims
arbitrarily complex. Since we argue that contract should bematched bymobile devices a complex procedure is likely to defy
the very spirit of our proposal.
Further, a number of independent security requirements analyses for mobile and distributed systems [24,37,52] show
that detailed contracts are not really necessary. The characteristic feature of these applications is that they need wide access
to services to execute correctly. Yet, the user still wants to control that these services are not abused ormisused. Therefore the
same permission can be granted or not granted depending, for instance, on previous actions of themidlet or some conditions
on application environment.
Some examples of security policies for mobile devices include:
1. The application sends no more than a speciﬁc number of messages in each session.
2. The application only loads each image from the network once.
3. The delay between two periodic invocations of the midlet is at least T.
4. The application does not initiate calls to international numbers.
5. The application only uses ﬁles whose names match a given pattern.
6. The application does not send MMS messages.
7. The application connects only to its origin domain.
8. The application does not use the FileConnection.delete() function.
9. The application only receives SMS messages on a speciﬁc port.
10. The length of a SMS message sent does not exceed the payload of a single SMS message.
11. The application must close all ﬁles that it opens.
5 A Java application that conforms to the Mobile Information Device Proﬁle (MIDP) standard.
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Fig. 2. A fragment of the ConSpec syntax.
Notice the difference between policies 1 and 2. The ﬁrst one speciﬁes the constraint on a single execution (session) of
the program. The second one puts a restriction on all runs of the application. Policy 3 also requires to make a distinction
between multiple sessions of the application. For this reason, the contract must include the constructs that deﬁne the scope
of the obligation. Moreover, such policies as policy 11 are most naturally expressed at the level of separate objects (in this
case objects of type FileConnection).
We provide an overviewof the ConSpec syntax, the language exploited to specify contracts and policieswithin the context
of the S×C framework. A full description of the language is outside the scope of the paper (interested readers can consult
[2]).
A speciﬁcation in ConSpec is a non-empty list of rules. Each rule is deﬁned for the speciﬁc part of contract (e.g. rule for the
SMS messages, for Bluetooth connections, etc.) and describes security properties for the given part. Fig. 2 shows a fragment
of the ConSpec syntax for specifying one single rule.
The RuleID tag identiﬁes the area of the contract, e.g. for restriction of sending text messages the identiﬁer could be
"TEXT_MESSAGES" or for accessing the ﬁle system the identiﬁer could be "FILE_ACCESS".
Each rule consists of three parts: scope deﬁnition, state declaration and a list of event clauses.
There are different scopes in ConSpec: scope Object is used when the rule can be applied for the object of speciﬁc class;
scope Session if the security properties are applicable for the single run of the application; scope Multisession when the
rule describes behavior of the application during its multiple runs and scope Global for executions of all applications of
a system. This notion of scope deﬁnition in ConSpec differs from scope in MIDP because the scope in MIDP deﬁnes set of
capabilities, namely User interface, Persistent storage, Networking, and Timers.
Example 3.1. Fig. 3 shows the ConSpec speciﬁcations of contract and policy of Example 2.1. Both speciﬁcations consist of two
rules, one with the identiﬁer HIGH_LEVEL_CONNECTIONS and the other one SMS_MESSAGES. In each case the ﬁrst rule speciﬁes
the restrictions on using the data connections, and the second one on sending short messages. Each identiﬁer of the rule is
followed by the scope declaration. As the policy is to be applied to each run of the application separately, the appropriate
scope is Session (which is, in fact, the most common one).
The state space of the policy is deﬁned after the scope. The state declaration deﬁnes the state variables to be used in
the current rule of the ConSpec speciﬁcation. The variables can be constant and non-constant. All non-constant variables
characterize the state of the automaton deﬁned by the rule. Constant variables are simply used in the speciﬁcation and do
not play signiﬁcant role in automaton construction.
Variables can be boolean, integer or string. However, the states have to be ﬁnite and all types have to be bounded. Hence,
a ConSpec speciﬁcation has two tags: MAXINT to deﬁne maximum value of integers and MAXLEN to deﬁne maximum length
of strings. If variables should have less variability, then the keyword RANGE is used for a more precise bound, as in rule
SMS_MESSAGES of the policy (Fig. 3b).
Themost importantpart of the rule is a sequenceof event clauses. Theevent clausesdeﬁne the transitionsof theautomaton
constructed from the ConSpec rule. Each event clause has a list of guard conditions and an update block which will be
performed when the corresponding guard condition holds.
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Fig. 3. ConSpec speciﬁcation of the contract and the policy of Example 2.1.
Every event is deﬁned by amodiﬁer and a signature APImethod, including name of the class,method name and optionally
list of parameters. The modiﬁers (BEFORE, AFTER and EXCEPTIONAL) indicate the moment, in which the update block must be
executed.
Example 3.2. In the ﬁrst rule (HIGH_LEVEL_CONNECTIONS) of the contract and the policy from Example 2.1 only one event is
raised each time before the method to open a connection (javax.microedition.io.Connector.open) is called.
When the program attempts to call the security-relevant method the guard conditions are evaluated in the same order,
in which they appear in the policy. The condition is a boolean expression on the state variables and possible parameters of
the method. If the condition evaluates to true then the corresponding update block is executed, and the control returns to
the target program.
Example 3.3. In our contract, if the program attempts to call the method javax.microedition.io.Connector.open
with the url starting with https the method is executed without performing any update (the keyword skip denotes the
empty update block). Otherwise if the url string does not start with https (the attempted connection is not secure) no
condition evaluates to true, so the contract is violated.
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Fig. 4. ConSpec Speciﬁcation of the contract and the policy of Example 2.2.
The guard condition can be replaced by the keyword ELSE; in this case the corresponding update block will always run
if all other blocks evaluate to false. If the condition is set to false, then the current event can never run according to the
speciﬁcation.
Example 3.4. In the second rule (SMS_MESSAGES) of the contract and the policy of Example 2.1 we deﬁne two events: before
and after the method that sends a message. All security-relevant events that might be declared in the policy should be
presented in the contract, otherwise the contract-policy matching will fail when it should succeed. Therefore we need
to declare AFTER javax.wireless.messaging.MessageConnection.send event in the contract in order to run the matching
procedure on many different policies and have a correct result.
Example 3.5. Fig. 4 shows the ConSpec speciﬁcations of the contract and the policy of Example 2.2, respectively.
4. Contract-policy matching
In this section we provide a generic algorithm for contract-policy matching. The algorithm is generic since it does not
depend on the formal model adopted for specifying the semantics of rules (process algebra, security automata, Petri Nets,
and so on), but instead it is deﬁned by means of speciﬁc abstract constructs. Therefore, to exploit the algorithm it will be
sufﬁcient to have an implementation of these constructs in the formal language adopted for specifying rules. In Section 6 we
will provide an automata-based implementation of such constructs, giving in this way a complete version of the algorithm
for rules formally speciﬁed with ﬁnite-state automata.
We have identiﬁed the following abstract operators (C and P indicate a generic contract and policy respectively):
• [Combine Operator ⊕] Spec = ⊕i=1,... ,nSpeci
It combines all the formal rule speciﬁcations Spec
1
, . . . , Specn in a new speciﬁcation Spec.
• [Simulate Operator ≈] SpecC ≈ SpecP
It returns1 if formal rule speciﬁcationSpecC canbe followedaccordinglyby formal rule speciﬁcationSpecP , 0otherwise.
Intuitively, if the policy cannot follow then the contract is not compliant, i.e. that particular rule is a violation.
• [Contained-By Operator ] SpecC  SpecP
It returns 1 if the behavior speciﬁed by SpecC is among the behaviors that are allowed by SpecP , 0 otherwise.
• [Traces Operator] S = Traces (Spec)
It returns the set S of all the possible sequences of actions that can be performed according to the formal speciﬁcation
Spec.
We assume that the above abstract constructs are characterized by the following properties:
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Property 4.1. Traces
(
Spec
1
⊕ Spec
2
) = Traces (Spec
1
) ∪ Traces (Spec
2
)
.
Property 4.2. Spec
1
 Spec
2
⇔ Traces (Spec
1
) ⊆ Traces (Spec
2
)
.
Property 4.3. Spec
1
≈ Spec
2
⇒ Traces (Spec
1
) ⊆ Traces (Spec
2
)
.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Exact Matching). Matching should succeed if and only if by executing the application on the platform every
trace that satisﬁes the application’s contract also satisﬁes the platform’s policy
Traces
(
⊕i=1,... ,nSpecCi
)
⊆ Traces
(
⊕i=1,... ,mSpecPi
)
Deﬁnition 4.2 (Sound Sufﬁcient Matching). Matching should fail if by executing the application on the platform there might
be an application trace that satisﬁes the contract and does not satisfy the policy.
Deﬁnition 4.3 (Complete Matching). Matching should succeed if by executing the application on the platform every trace
satisfying the contract also satisﬁes the policy.
By applying Deﬁnition 4.2 we might reject “good” applications that are however too difﬁcult or too complex to perform.
On the other hand, Deﬁnition 4.3 may allow “bad” (malicious) applications to run but it will certainly accept all “good”
ones (and “bad" applications can later be detected, for instance, by run-time monitoring). Examples of matching between
contracts and policies follow. As shown in Fig. 5, the generic contract/policymatching algorithm takes as inputs two rule sets
RC and RP representing respectively the contract and the policy to be matched. The algorithm checks if RC “matches" RP .
Algorithm 1 lists the source code of the MatchContracts function, which is the root function of the whole algorithm.
Basically, the algorithm works as follows. First of all, both rule sets RC and RP are partitioned according to the scope of the
rules (lines 1 and 2). This is done by calling the Partition procedure (Algorithm 2) that partitions a generic rule set R in a
sequence of rule sets with the same scope:
〈
R
SESSION
,R
MULTISESSION
,
{R
class
}
class∈ζ C
〉
. This partition is necessary because in the
S×C framework comparison of rules starts only within a certain scope. Once created two sequences of scope-speciﬁc rule
sets (one for the contract and one for the policy), the algorithm checks if each rule set in the sequence of the contractmatches
the corresponding rule set in the sequence of the policy (lines 3–11). In other words, we match rules within the same scope.
This is done by calling the MatchRules function (lines 4–6) that we discuss in the next paragraph. If all succeeds (line 11),
then the contract matches the policy. Otherwise, matching fails.
5. Rule and speciﬁcation matching
Matching between rules is performed by the MatchRules function (Algorithm 3). Since the rules of the two input setsRC
andRP must have the same scope, before doing matching checks the algorithm cleansRC andRP removing the scope from
each rule. As a consequence, two sets LC and LP of pairs
(
IDC/P , SpecC/P
)
are built. Now the algorithm is ready to check the
contract/policy match. Each pair in LP is compared with the set LC by means of the MatchSpec function (line 4). When a
match is not found for a pair (line 6), i.e. the MatchSpec function returns 0, that pair is stored in a rule set LP
failed
(line 7).
Fig. 5. Contract-policy matching problem.
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If for all rules in LP there exists a match with LC , i.e. theMatchSpec function returns 1 for each pair in LP so that LP
failed
= ∅,
then the match between rules succeeds and the algorithm returns 1 (lines 10–11). Otherwise, if LP
failed
/= ∅ (i.e. there are
no rules in LC that match with the rules of LP
failed
) then the algorithm performs a last “global” check. More precisely, the
combination of the rules in LC is matched with the combination of the rules in LP
failed
(line 13). If also this match does not
succeed, then the algorithm returns 0, otherwise it returns 1.
Algorithm 1 MatchContracts Function
Input: rule setRC , rule setRP
Output: 1 ifRC matchesRP , 0 otherwise
1:
〈
RC
SESSION
,RC
MULTISESSION
,
{
RC
class
}
class∈ζ C
〉
⇐ Partition
(
RC
)
2:
〈
RP
SESSION
,RP
MULTISESSION
,
{
RP
class
}
class∈ζ P
〉
⇐ Partition
(
RP
)
3: if MatchRules
(
RC
SESSION
,RP
SESSION
)
then
4: if MatchRules
(
RC
MULTISESSION
,RP
MULTISESSION
)
then
5: for all class ∈ ζ P do // for all classes in policy
6: if MatchRules
(
RC
class
,RP
class
)
then // if class ∈ ζ C , thenRC
class
= ∅
7: skip
8: else
9: return(0)
10: end if
11: end for
12: return(1)
13: end if
14: end if
15: return(0)
Algorithm 2 Partition Procedure
Input: rule setR
Output:
〈
R
SESSION
,R
MULTISESSION
,
{R
class
}
class∈ζ
〉
1: R
SESSION
⇐ {r ∈ R | Scope(r) = SESSION}
2: R
MULTISESSION
⇐ {r ∈ R | Scope(r) = MULTISESSION}
3: for all class ∈ ζ do // for all classes in contract/policy
4: R
class
⇐ {r ∈ R | Scope(r) = OBJECT < class >}
5: end for
Algorithm 3 MatchRules Function
Input: rule setRC , rule setRP
Output: 1 ifRC matchesRP , 0 otherwise
1: LC ⇐
{(
IDC , SpecC
) ∣∣∣ 〈scope, IDC , SpecC 〉 ∈ RC}
2: LP ⇐
{(
IDP , SpecP
) ∣∣∣ 〈scope, IDP , SpecP 〉 ∈ RP}
3: for all
(
IDP , SpecP
)
∈ LP do
4: if MatchSpec
(
LC ,
(
IDP , SpecP
))
then
5: skip
6: else //may return ∅ for efﬁciency
7: LP
failed
⇐ LP
failed
∪
(
IDP , SpecP
)
8: end if
9: end for
10: if LP
failed
= ∅ then
11: return(1)
12: else
13: return
(
MatchSpec
((
*, ⊕(IDC , SpecC)∈LC
)
,
(
*, ⊕(IDP , SpecP)∈LPfailed
)))
14: end if
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Algorithm 4 MatchSpec Function
Input: LC =
〈(
IDC
1
, SpecC
1
)
, . . . ,
(
IDCn , Spec
C
n
)〉
,
(
IDP , SpecP
)
Output: 1 if LC matches
(
IDP , SpecP
)
, 0 otherwise
1: if ∃
(
IDC , SpecC
)
∈ LC ∧ IDC = IDP then
2: if HASH(SpecC ) = HASH(SpecP ) then
3: return(1)
4: else if SpecC ≈ SpecP then
5: return(1)
6: else if SpecC  SpecP then
7: return(1)
8: else // Restriction: if same ID then same speciﬁcation must match
9: return(0)
10: end if
11: else
12: MatchSpec
((
*, ⊕(IDC , SpecC)∈LC
)
,
(
*, SpecP
))
13: end if
The MatchSpec function (Algorithm 4) checks the match between a set of pairs LC =
〈(
IDC
1
, SpecC
1
)
, . . . ,
(
IDCn , Spec
C
n
)〉
and a pair
(
IDP , SpecP
)
representing respectively the rules of the contract and a rule of the policy to bematched. The function
returns 1 in two situations:
1. there exists a pair
(
IDC , SpecC
)
in LC that matches with
(
IDP , SpecP
)
2. the combination of all the speciﬁcations in LC matches with
(
IDP , SpecP
)
Otherwise, the function returns 0.
Speciﬁcation matching is veriﬁed as follows. If there exists a pair
(
IDC , SpecC
)
in LC such that IDC is equal to IDP (line
1), then the algorithm checks the hash values of the speciﬁcations SpecC and SpecP . Matching succeeds if they have the
same value (line 2). Otherwise, the algorithm checks if SpecC simulates SpecP (line 4). If this is the case, then the matching
succeeds, otherwise the more computationally expensive containment check is performed (line 6). If also this check fails,
the algorithm ends and matching fails (because the rules with the same ID must have the same speciﬁcation).
If there exists no pair in LC such that IDC is equal to IDP (line 11) then the algorithm checks the match between the
combination of all the speciﬁcations in LC and
(
IDP , SpecP
)
(line 12).
It should be clear now why the described algorithm is generic. To be actually executed, it needs a well deﬁned formal
semantics and implementation of the abstract constructs. Several formal tools might be used for this purpose, such as
standard process algebras, Petri Nets and so on. As a concrete example, in the next Section we will discuss the case of rules
speciﬁed by means of speciﬁc automata, providing a real implementation of the constructs and as a result of the overall
matching algorithm.
6. Contract-policy matching with security automata
In this section we show how the matching algorithm can be used when the behavior of rules is speciﬁed by means of
speciﬁc automata, namely AutomataModulo Theory (AMT ) [33]. As already remarked in Section 4we just need to provide an
implementation of the ⊕,  and ≈ operators used in Algorithms 3 and 4. For the sake of clarity, we brieﬂy introduce AMT .
Then we brieﬂy describe the algorithms for implementing the abstract constructs.
AMT generalizes the ﬁnite state automata of model-carrying code [45] and extends Büchi Automata (BA). The theory
of AMT is a combination of the theory of Büchi Automata (BA) with satisﬁability-modulo-theory (SMT) problem. SMT
problem, which decides the satisﬁability of ﬁrst-order formulas modulo background theories, stretch the boundaries of
formal veriﬁcation based on effective SAT solvers. In contrast to classical security automata we prefer to use BA because,
besides safety properties, there are also some liveness properties which have to be veriﬁed. An example of liveness is “The
application uses all the permissions it requests”.
AMT automaton which represents a model of the system can be extracted directly from the control-ﬂow graph of
the program. This automaton speciﬁes actual behavior of the system. An automaton that speciﬁes the desired behavior can
be either built directly or from other speciﬁcation languages. For example, a ﬁnite state automaton for a temporal logic
speciﬁcation can be constructed using the tableaux method [29].
Example 6.1. To illustrate how AMT can be used for property speciﬁcation let us show the automata for the contract and
the policy in Example 2.1 represented in Fig. 6. The automaton on Fig. 6a represents an automaton for the ﬁrst rule of contract.
Starting from state q0 we stay in this state while no connection is opened (¬joc). When a connection is opened, we stay in
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Fig. 6. Automata specifying the rules of the contract and the policy of Example 2.1.
this state only if started connection Connector.open(string url) method is a secure one, i.e. url starts with "https://". We enter
state error if we start an unsecure connection Connector.open(string url), e.g. url starts with "http://" or "sms://" etc. In the
automaton for the second rule of the contract, the conditions of the transactions that represent the change of a state after the
occurrence of the security relevant event have the form ajms ∧ ¬bjms or bjms ∧ ¬ajms instead of more simple ajms or bjms.
The purpose of this is to reﬂect faithfully the fact that in the program according to our assumption two security-relevant
events can never occur in the same moment. These examples are from a Java VM. Since we do not consider useful to invent
our own names for API calls we use the javax.microedition APIs (though a bit verbose) for the notation that is shown in
Fig. 6.
The exploitation of automata for formally specifying rules allows a straightforward implementation of the combine
operator ⊕: rules are combined by simply making the synchronous product of the related automata.
Also contract-matching can be simply represented as language inclusion. Given two automata AutCand AutP representing
respectively a formal rule speciﬁcation of a contract (SpecC ) and of a policy (SpecP), SpecC  SpecP when LAutC ⊆ LAutP, i.e.
the language accepted by AutC is a subset of the language accepted by AutP. Informally, each behavior of AutC is among the be-
haviors that are allowed by the policy AutP. Assuming that the automata are closed under intersection and complementation,
then the matching problem can be reduced to an emptiness test [8]:
LAutC ⊆ LAutP ⇔ LAutC ∩ LAutP = ∅ ⇔ LAutC ∩ LAutP = ∅
In other words, there is no behavior of AutC that is disallowed by AutP. If the intersection is not empty, any behavior in it
corresponds to a counterexample.
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Fig. 7. Automata specifying the rules of the contract and the policy of Example 2.2.
Our goal is to provide application-contract vs. platform-policymatching on-the-ﬂy, namely during the actual download of
themidlet. Thus, issues like small memory footprint, and effective computations play a key role. Therefore, we are interested
in ﬁnding counterexamples faster and we combine algorithm based on Nested DFS [43] with decision procedure (for details
see [33]). The algorithm takes as input the application’s contract and themobile platform’s policy as automata and then starts
a depth ﬁrst search procedure over the initial state. When a “suspect state" (which is an accepting state) is reached we have
two cases. First, when a suspect state contains an error state of the complemented policy (AutP) then we report a security
policy violation without further ado. Second, when a suspect state does not contain an error state of the complemented
policy we start a new depth ﬁrst search from the suspect state to determine whether it is in a cycle, i.e. it is reachable from
itself. If it is we report availability violation.
Thematching algorithmdoes not construct the product automaton explicitly but on-the-ﬂy. The on-the-ﬂy emptiness test
(constructing product automaton while searching the automata) is lifted from the algorithm by Coucubertis et al. [6] with
modiﬁcation of this algorithm from Holzmann et al.’s [26] considered as state-of-the-art (used in Spin [25]). The complexity
results if the theory T is decidable with an oracle for the decision problem in the complexity class C [33]:
• The non-emptiness problem is decidable in LIN − TIMEC .
• The non-emptiness problem is NLOG − SPACEC .
An alternative approach would be to use simulations between the contract automata and the policy automata. Several
notions of simulation relations for automata have been introduced in the literature ([15,14,10] to mention only a few) and
discussing each of them is outside the scope of the paper. Intuitively, we can say that a state qi of an automata A “simulates"
a state qj of an automata B if every “behavior" starting at q can be mimicked, step by step, starting at qj .
The main approach for determining simulation relations among automata consists of reducing the simulation problem
to a simulation game, i.e. to the problem of searching the winning strategy of a parity game graph [14]. We have adapted a
simulation construct following the approach [15]. Basically, a parity game graph is constructed starting from two automata A
andB and according to awell speciﬁc notion of simulation relation. Then the Jurdzinski Algorithm [28] is used for determining
the set of winning nodes.
Example 6.2. Let us focus on Example 2.2. The ConSpec speciﬁcations of the contract and the policy (Fig. 4a and b,
respectively) are translated into the two automata represented in Fig. 7. If we use language inclusion for matching then
we have to complement the policy automaton on Fig. 7b, where we have only one accepting state, namely error and the
complementation transitions remain the same as the original transitions. Afterwards, we check the emptiness of intersection
between automaton on Fig. 7a and the complemented policy automaton. Since the emptiness check fails, thenmatching fails.
Anothermeans to check for matching is by simulation, where given the two automata we construct a game graph and search
for a winning strategy for a protagonist. If automaton of policy (Fig. 7b) can simulate automaton of contract (Fig. 7a) then
matching succeeds, where in our current example the simulation fails.
7. Software architecture
In this sectionwedescribe the software architecture of the prototype that implements the overallmatching algorithm. The
mainaim is toprovideaconcreteandhigh-level overviewofhowtheprototypeworks, fromits inputs (ConSpec speciﬁcations)
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Fig. 8. Architecture of the matching prototype.
to its output (match succeeded/failed). To this purpose, we will also show what happens when the prototype is executed
with our running examples as inputs.
As remarked in Section 4, there can be many ways to do the actual formal matching (simulation, language inclusion, ...).
Although the prototype has been implemented with several matching algorithms, for the sake of simplicity from now onwe
will focus only on matching as language inclusion (as discussed in Section 6).
The contract-matching prototype takes as input a contract and a policy both speciﬁed in ConSpec and checks whether or
not the contract matches the policy. A sketch of the prototype architecture is shown in Fig. 8.
As the computational resources of mobile devices are normally limited and performing heavy computations exhausts the
battery, the motivation behind the design of our prototype has been to move as much operations as possible off the device.
For this reason, the prototype is basically composed of two tools: an off-device ConSpec parser and the main matching
algorithm that runs on the device. The parser takes as input a ConSpec ﬁle and returns a Java source code ﬁle representing
the automata-based rule set (that is, the list of rules grouped by scope of the contract/policy, where each rule is speciﬁed by
means of an automaton).
The matching algorithm needs as inputs (1) a rule of the contract and (2) a rule of the policy. Since we are using the
language inclusion method, the rule representing the policy needs to be complemented. The complementation of the policy
needs to be done only once at the time of deployment of the policy on the mobile device and therefore is performed directly
by the off-device parser. This can be done by simply calling the parser with a speciﬁc parameter ‘c’ or ‘p’ (along with the path
to the ConSpec ﬁle) that indicates whether it is a contract or a policy in input. The parsing procedure creates two Policy class
instances, each of them contains the list of rules grouped by scope. Each rule instance contains the corresponding automaton
(AutomatonMTT class instance) that is needed for the inclusion.
When the main algorithm starts, the contract and the policy represented as Policy class instances are already part of the
program codebase and thematching procedure can begin. No computational resources are spent on parsing the speciﬁcation
or complementing the policy automaton. For every rule in the policy wemust have a corresponding rule in the contract with
same RULEID and SCOPE tags: if this is not the case the whole match fails, otherwise we perform the inclusionmatch on this
pair.
If the inclusion match fails, the whole procedure halts with a “failure”. If it succeeds the procedure continues with the
next pair of rules. The described step is repeated until all rules in the policy have been successfully checked against the rules
in the contract.
Example 7.1. Back to our running examples, let us consider Example 2.1. Given a contract and a policy in ConSpec (Fig. 3a and
b) as inputs, the prototype translates these speciﬁcations into automata (Fig. 6). Such automata are then used as inputs of the
language inclusion algorithm. Speciﬁcally, for each rule in the policywe search for corresponding rule in the contract and run
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Fig. 9. ConSpec parser.
emptiness checking algorithm on the corresponding two rules. The ﬁrst pair of rules with the same RuleID is the one showed
in Fig. 3a and b. Since the contract allows to use HTTPS connections only while the policy allows to use both HTTP and HTTPS
connections the obtained result states that the contract matches the policy. For the other rule in the policy an appropriate
rule in the contract is found. Here the contract forbids the application to send messages while the policy prescribes that
the application can send bounded amount of messages. As a result, the matching algorithm ends successfully: the contract
matches the policy.
Example 7.2. Let us focus on Example 2.2. The ConSpec speciﬁcations of Fig. 4a and b are translated into the two automata
represented in Fig. 7. Here the matching fails because the algorithm ﬁnds a cycle. This is because the contract allows to
receive more data then the policy.
The parser implements the mapping from a ConSpec contract/policy to a Java source ﬁle (list of AutomatonMTT class
instances). A sketch of the implemented parser is shown in Fig. 9. At ﬁrst step (I), a syntax tree containing all the signiﬁcant
items of the contract/policy is made.
In the second transformation (II), the parser ﬁnds all the events and builds a speciﬁc structure called AST. Each event now
has a list of guarded commands. Each guarded command consists of condition on state variables, condition on parameters
of the method and actions for the guard.
During the next step (III), the automaton is built from the AST. First, we generate the list of expressions that will be used
for creating the transitions taking into account that only one security event at a time may happen. Second, we create all
the states and then all the transitions for every pair of state and generated expression. The detailed mapping procedure is
outside the scope of the paper. Interested readers can ﬁnd it in [12].
Finally, the last step (IV) creates the Java source code containing the instance of the automaton.
The language inclusion matching interacts with the SMT solver NuSMV6 for satisﬁability checks as shown in Algorithms
5 and 6. We create the instance of the NuSMV class only once at the beginning of the on-the-ﬂy procedure; then we declare
variables, add and remove constraints from the library every time we call the solver. Constraints for the solver are often
repeated during the running algorithm (at least the constraints for searching for accepting state and searching for cycles are
the same). To avoid calling the solver frequently for the same problem we added two lists in the DFSAlgorithm class:
6 http://nusmv.irst.itc.it/.
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Table_SAT and Table_UNSAT. The Table_SAT contains the constraints that are checked by the solver and result is SAT. Similarly,
Table_UNSAT contains the constraints that are checked by the solver and result is UNSAT.
We faced a number of design options:
ONE_INSTANCE versus MANY_INSTANCES. We could either create only one instance of solver, relying on the solver to assert
and retract expressions on demand, or create a new instance of the solver every time we call the decision procedure.
MUTEX_SOLVER. Method names are declared as mutex constants at the moment of declaring all variables on the solver, due to
an edge in the automaton (correspond to a method) which is incompatible with another edge (correspond to a different
method).
MUTEX_MC. Method names are not declared as mutex constants, allowing the on-the-ﬂy algorithm to check whether method
names are the same.
PRIORITY_MC. Guards are evaluated using priority or and we can optimize the expressions sent to the decision procedure as
minimized expression.
CACHING_MC. We saved time by caching the results of the matching.
CACHING_SOLVER. The solver itself has a caching mechanism that could be equally used.
However, MANY_INSTANCES decision was not possible to be taken because of the garbage collection management both by
the Java virtual machine and by the libraries of MathSAT/NuSMV (only one instance of solver exists at time).
We ran our experiments on a Desktop PC (Intel(R) Pentium(R) D CPU 3.40 GHz, 3389.442 MHz, 1.99 GB of RAM, 2048 KB
cache size) with operating system Linux version 2.6.20-16-generic, Kubuntu 7.04 (Feisty Fawn). The desktop implementation
was mostly used for proﬁling and extracting details on the algorithm as a proﬁling tool was not available on the mobile
device.
We also ported the prototype to the mobile, namely HTC P3600 (3G PDA phone) with ROM 128 MB, RAM 64 MB,
Samsung®SC32442A processor 400 MHz and operating system Microsoft Windows Mobile®5.0.
The experiments were made for different design decisions for different problem suites (see [4] for details). The problem
suites covered different kind of categories such as network connectivity, use of costly functionalities, or private information
management.
We collected data on resources used, namely number of visited states, number of visited transitions, running time for
each problem in each design alternative, and the number of solved problems against time. We present the result obtained
for alternative with MUTEX_MC, ONE_INSTANCE and CACHING_SOLVER in Table 1. Most problems have few states and transitions
as a result thematching algorithm runtime is little (around 2.5 s on the desktop and 4 s on themobile). Even for pathological
problem with 102 visited states, the runtime on a mobile platform is still acceptable (9.3 s on the desktop, 11.3 s on the
mobile).
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Table 1
Running problem suite 10 times.
(a) Running Problem Suite.
Problem Desktop Mobile Result
ART (s) CRT (s) SV TV ART (s) CRT (s) SV TV
MUTEX_MC ONE_INSTANCE CACHING_SOLVER
P1 2.4 2.4 2 6 4.3 4.3 2 6 Match
P2 2.4 4.8 2 6 4.1 8.4 2 6 Match
P3 2.4 7.2 3 11 3.9 12.3 3 11 Match
P4 2.4 9.6 2 6 4.0 16.3 2 6 Match
P5 4.7 14.3 3 11 4.1 20.4 3 11 Match
P6 2.9 2.9 4 4 3.8 3.8 3 6 Not match
P7 2.8 5.7 5 7 3.8 7.6 2 4 Not match
P8 2.9 8.6 5 7 3.8 11.4 3 6 Not match
P100 9.3 9.3 102 307 11.3 11.3 102 307 Match
(b) Abbreviations.
ART: Average Runtime for 10 runs SV: Number of Visited States.
CRT: Cumulative Average Runtime TV: Number of Visited Transitions.
While the timing of the desktop is obviously faster, the cumulative runtime of solved problems is still manageable for
the mobile user. An expected nice feature conﬁrmed by the experiments is that the runtime will be longer for the problems
that match (the algorithm has to run over all states until the cycle is found) than for the problems that do not match (the
algorithm stops working as soon as counterexample is found). In the matching case the user has to wait longer but at least
those are the applications that he would later run.
8. Related work and conclusions
Contracts are formal agreements to express the relation between a supplier and its clients, expressing each party’s rights
and obligations. Following the classiﬁcation proposed in [5] there are basic or syntactic contracts, assertion-based contracts,
behavioral contracts, synchronization contracts and quality-of-service (QoS) contracts.
Syntactic contracts are required for basic component interoperability. Contracts of this level specify the types, structures
and signatures of components and methods through interfaces and types deﬁnitions.
Assertion-based contracts are the original contracts proposed by Bertrand Meyer [7,35]. A contract between a routine
and its callers is deﬁned by two assertions: a precondition and a postcondition. In addition to contracts bound to a
singlemethod, global properties on each instance of a class can be expressedusing an assertionnamed class invariant.
Behavioral contracts [22] add the speciﬁcation of the entities involved and an ordered sequence of the message ex-
changed by those entities.
Synchronization contracts [16] describe concurrent relations between services provided by components (sequence,
parallelism or shufﬂe). They can be bound to a single method, declaring under which circumstances the method
accesses a resource or they can be bound to a collection of methods or objects.
QoS contracts can be speciﬁed statically by enumerating the features that the server objects will respect or dynamically
by negotiation between the object client and its server [5].
The notion of contract proposed in this paper is essentially those of behavioral contracts.
In the realm of security research, ﬁvemain approaches tomobile code security can be broadly identiﬁed in the literature:
sandboxes limit the instructions available for use, code signing ensures that code originates from a trusted source, security
automata proscribes execution of mobile code containing violations of the security policy, proof-carrying code (PCC) carries
explicit proof of its safety andmodel-carrying code (MCC) carries security-relevant behavior of the mobile code.
The Sandbox Security Model is the original security model provided by Java. The essence of the approach [17] is that a
computer entrusts local code with full access to vital system resources (such as the ﬁle system). It does not, however, trust
downloaded remote code (such as applets), which can access only the limited resources provided inside the sandbox. The
limitation of this approach is that it can provide security but only at the cost of unduly restricting the functionality of mobile
code (e.g. the code is not permitted to access any ﬁles). The sandbox model has been subsequently extended in Java 2 [18],
where permissions available for programs from a code source are speciﬁed through a security policy. Policies are decided
solely by the code consumer without any involvement of the producer. The implementation of security checking is done by
means of a run-time stack inspection technique [47].
In .NET [30] each assembly is associated with some default set of permissions according to the level of trust. However,
the application can request additional permissions. These requests are stored in the application’s manifest and are used at
load-time as the input to policy, which decides whether they should be granted. Permissions can also be requested at run-
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time. Then, if granted, they are valid within the limit of the same method, in which they were requested. The set of possible
permissions includes, for instance, permissions to use sockets, web, ﬁle IO, etc.
Cryptographic code-signing is the complement of sandboxing. It is widely used for certifying the origin (i.e., the producer)
ofmobile codeand its integrity. Typically, the softwaredeveloperuses aprivatekey to signexecutable content. Theapplication
loading the module then veriﬁes this content using the corresponding public key and then the code can run with the full
privileges associated with the signature.
This technique is useful only for verifying that the code originated from a trusted producer and it does not address the
fundamental risk inherent to mobile code, which relates to mobile code behavior. This leaves the consumer vulnerable to
damage due to malicious code (if the producer cannot be trusted) or faulty code (if the producer can be trusted). Indeed, if
the code originated from an untrusted or unknown producer, then code-signing provides no support for safe execution of
such code. On the other hand, code signing does not protect against bugs already present in the signed code. Patches or new
versions of the code can be issued, but the loader (which veriﬁes and loads the executable content and then transfers the
execution control to themodule) will still accept the old version, unless the newer version is installed over it. [36] proposes a
method that employs an executable content loader and a short-lived conﬁgurationmanagement ﬁle to address this software
aging problem.
Another mechanism for security property enforcement is security automata [42,19]. The automaton itself is a ﬁnite
state automaton, whose input is an event stream of security-relevant actions. Now the mobile code is not accompanied by
additional information, it is only executed in tandem with simulation of the security automaton. If action stream in the
given code violates automaton then the execution of untrusted code terminates. A wider class of automata were presented
to enable modiﬁcations of code execution: edit automata [3] may terminate the application, truncating the program action
stream (as a simple security automata); suppress undesired actions evenwithout termination of the program; and theymay
insert additional actions into the event stream. Those enforcement mechanisms complement the matching aspect that we
describe here and are essentially used for the run-time monitoring step that we have presented in Fig. 1.
It is not necessary to use ﬁnite state automata for run-time monitoring. For instance, temporal logic formulae are widely
applied for this purpose [21]. Since there is a mapping from temporal logic to FSA, one can translate policies written as logic
formulae into automata-based language and vice versa.
The Proof Carrying Code (PCC) approach [39] launched the idea that untrusted code is accompanied by additional
information that aids in verifying its safety. Within PCC, this additional information takes the form of a proof regarding
the safety of mobile code. Then the code consumer uses a proof validator to check, with certainty, that the proof is valid (i.e.,
it checks the correctness of this proof) and hence the foreign code is safe to execute. Proofs are automatically generated by
a certifying compiler [40] by means of a static analysis of the producer code. The traditional approach to PCC based on type
theory is problematic for twomain reasons noted by Sekar et al. [44]. A practical difﬁculty is that automatic proof generation
for complex properties is still a daunting problem, requiring expertise in logic and theorem proving that is beyond reach for
normal developers. A more fundamental difﬁculty is that the type-theory approach is based on an unrealistic assumption
[44]: the safety proof is based on a type system and this type system cannot be conﬁgured for each individual policy. This
appears an impractical assumption since security may vary considerably across different consumers and their operating
environments.
Model Carrying Code (MCC) is the other seminal work beside Meyer’s one on which our proposal is based that requires
a producer to furnish a model regarding the safety of mobile code [45]. With MCC, this additional information captures the
security-relevant behavior of the code. Models enable code producers to communicate the security needs of their code to the
consumer. The code consumers can then check their policies against themodel associated with untrusted code to determine
if this code will violate their policy. Since MCC models are signiﬁcantly simpler than programs, such checking can be fully
automated. Thismodel has beenmainly proposed for bridging the gap between high-level policies and low-level binary code,
enabling analyses which would otherwise be impractical. The major limitation was that MCC had not fully developed the
issue of contract matching and had limited itself to ﬁnite state automata which are too simple to describe realistic policies.
The notion of certiﬁed inline monitors [48,19] can bridge the gap between security-by-contract and proof-carrying-code.
Essentially, an inline monitor rewrites the application code by inserting at speciﬁc points the security checks [13]. Such
inlining can generate in parallel a proof that the code complies with the contract that it is actually inlined. Then one can
ship the proof of the compliance of the contract with the application and the contract. Proof-checking techniques can then
be used to check the evidence in the corresponding step of Fig. 1. This has been currently implemented in [9].
A similar technique to inlinemonitoring is used in Aspect Oriented Programming (e.g. AspectJ) and in the implementation
of programming-by-contract in Java [1]. Loosely speaking theAPI calls that an inlined security automatawould like tomonitor
can be compared to point-cuts in aspects.
In this paper we have proposed the notion of security-by-contract where an application carries a mobile contract with
itself. The key idea of the approach is that a digital signature should not only certify the origin of the code but rather bind the
code with the contract. From this point of view, our framework makes some ideas behind MCC more concrete. In particular,
we use a high level speciﬁcation languagewith features that simplify contract-policymatching and allow expressing realistic
security policies. In the original work on MCC, the models that represent the behavior of the application are represented as
extended ﬁnite state automata (EFSA). However, the developedmatching algorithms for EFSA handle only simple caseswhen
the conditions on transactions are limited to equalities/inequalities [45]. In contrast, our approach allows us to expressmuch
more sophisticated conditions that include basic arithmetic and string operations. Furthermore, our matching algorithm is
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improved for efﬁciency intended for resource-critical devices as mobiles. Thus, we ﬁrst perform easier checks of sufﬁcient
criteria before a complete check (see Algorithm 4). These features differentiate our approach from other frameworks for
modeling resource contractualization such as [31].
The contributions of the paper are manifold. First, we have proposed the security-by-contract framework providing a
description of the overall life-cycle of mobile code in this setting. Then we have described a structure for a contractual
language. Starting from this language, we have proposed a number of algorithms for one of the key steps in the life-cycle
process: the issue of contract-policy matching. Finally, we have discussed the software architecture supporting all these
algorithms and evaluated its desktop and mobile implementation.
The paper can be seen as an updated summary of several papers describing different S×C technologies [2,4,11,33,34]. For
instance, the algorithms presented here as well as their implementation have been improved and optimized. Therefore, the
paper represents a ﬁrst, complete and updated presentation of the overall S×C contract-policy matching technology.
The main novelty of the proposed framework is that it would provide a semantics for digital signatures on mobile code
thus being a step in the transition from trusted code to trustworthy code.
Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank Marco Dalla Torre (University of Trento) for his contribution on the development of the
ﬁrst prototype of the software architecture.
References
[1] P. Abercrombie, M. Karaorman, Jcontractor: bytecode instrumentation techniques for implementing design by contract in java, in: Proceedings of
Second Workshop on Runtime Veriﬁcation, ENTCS, 2002, pp. 55–79.
[2] I. Aktug, K. Naliuka, ConSpec – a formal language for policyspeciﬁcation, in: Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on Run Time Enforcement for Mobile
and Distributed Systems (REM2007) , ENTCS, 2008, pp. 45–58.
[3] L. Bauer, J. Ligatti, D. Walker, Edit automata: enforcement mechanisms for run-time security policies, Internat. J. Inform. Security, 4 (1–2) (2005) 2–16.
[4] N. Bielova, I. Siahaan, Testing decision procedures for security-by-contract, FCS-ARSPA-WITS’08, 2008.
[5] A. Beugnard, J.-M. Jézéquel, N. Plouzeau, D. Watkins, Making components contract aware, Computer 32 (7) (1999) 38–45.
[6] C. Courcoubetis, M. Vardi, P. Wolper, M. Yannakakis, Memory-efﬁcient algorithms for the veriﬁcation of temporal properties, Formal Methods System
Des. 1 (2–3) (1992) 275–288.
[7] B.Meyer,Buildingbug-freeO–Osoftware:an introduction todesignbycontract.Availableat:http://archive.eiffel.com/doc/manuals/technology/contract/.
[8] E.M. Clarke, O. Grumberg, D.A. Peled, Model Checking, MIT Press, 2000.
[9] M. Dam, A. Lundblad, A proof carrying code framework for inlined reference monitors in Java bytecode, Technical Report, KTH, 2008.
[10] D.L. Dill, A.J. Hu, H. Wong-Toi, Checking for language inclusion using simulation relations, in: Proceedings of CAV’91: 3rd International Workshop on
Computer Aided Veriﬁcation, LNCS, 1992, pp. 329–341.
[11] N. Dragoni, F. Massacci, K. Naliuka, I. Siahaan, Security-by-contract: toward a semantics for digital signatures on mobile code, in: Proceedings of the
4th European PKI Worshop, LNCS, 2007, pp. 297–312.
[12] N. Dragoni, F. Massacci, K. Naliuka, I. Siahaan, T. Quillinan, I. Matteucci, C. Schaefer, Methodologies and tools for contract matching, Public Deliverable
D2.1.4, EU Project S3MS, 2007. Report available at: www.s3ms.org.
[13] U. Erlingsson, The inlined reference monitor approach to security policy enforcement, Technical Report 2003-1916, Department of Computer Science,
Cornell University, 2003.
[14] K. Etessami, A hierarchy of polynomial-time computable simulations for automata, in: Proceedings of CONCUR’02, LNCS, 2002, pp. 131–144.
[15] K. Etessami, T. Wilke, R. Schuller, Fair simulation relations, parity games, and state space reduction for buchi automata, in: Proceedings of ICALP’01,
LNCS, 2001, pp. 694–707.
[16] H. Giese, J. Graf, G. Wirtz, Contract-based coordination of distributed object systems, Proceedings of the International Conference on Parallel and
Distributed Processing Techniques and Applications (PDPTA’99), CSREA Press, 1999, pp. 25–31.
[17] L. Gong, Java security: present and near future, IEEE Micro 17 (3) (1997) 14–19.
[18] L. Gong, G. Ellison, Inside Java 2 Platform Security: Architecture, API Design, and Implementation, Pearson Education, 2003.
[19] K. Hamlen, G.Morrisett, F. Schneider, Certiﬁed in-lined referencemonitoring on .NET, in: PLAS ’06: Proceedings of the 2006Workshop on Programming
Languages and Analysis for Security, ACM Press, 2006, pp. 7–16.
[20] K.W. Hamlen, G. Morrisett, F.B. Schneider, Computability classes for enforcement mechanisms, ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Systems 28 (1) (2006)
175–205.
[21] K. Havelund, G. Rosu, Efﬁcient monitoring of safety properties, Internat. J. Software Tools Technol. Transfer 6 (2) (2004) 158–173.
[22] R. Helm, I.M. Holland, D. Gangopadhyay, Contracts: specifying behavioral compositions in object-oriented systems, in: Proceedings of OOPSLA’90, ACM
Press, 1990, pp. 169–180.
[23] T. Henzinger, O. Kupferman, S. Rajamani, Fair simulation, in: Proceedings of CONCUR’97, Academic Press, Inc., 1997, pp. 273–287.
[24] M. Hilty, A. Pretschner, C. Schaefer, T. Walter, Usage control requirements in mobile and ubiquitous computing applications, in: Proceedings of the
International Conference on Systems and Net. Comm. (ICSNC 2006), IEEE Press, 2006, p. 27.
[25] G. Holzmann, The Spin Model Checker: Primer and Reference Manual, Addison-Wesley Professional, 2004.
[26] G.J. Holzmann, D. Peled, M. Yannakakis, On nested depth ﬁrst search, in: Proceedings of the Second SPIN Workshop, American Mathematical Society,
1996, pp. 23–32.
[27] T. Jensen, D.L. Metayer, T. Thorn, Veriﬁcation of control ﬂow based security properties, in: Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
IEEE, 1999, pp. 89–103.
[28] M. Jurdzinski, Small progress measures for solving parity games, in: Proceedings of STACS’00, LNCS, 2000, pp. 290–301.
[29] Y. Kesten, Z. Manna, H. McGuire, A. Pnueli, A decision algorithm for full propositional temporal logic, in: Proceedings of CAV, LNCS, 1993, pp. 97–109.
[30] B. LaMacchia, S. Lange, NET Framework Security, Addison Wesley, 2002.
[31] N. Le Sommer, Towards dynamic resource contractualisation for software components, in: Proceedings of the International Working Conference on
Component Deployment (CD 2004), LNCS, 2004, pp. 129–143.
[32] F. Martinelli, I. Matteucci, Through modeling to synthesis of security automata, in: Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Security and
Trust Management, LNCS, 2006, pp. 31–46.
[33] F. Massacci, I. Siahaan, Matchingmidlet’s security claimswith a platform security policyusing automatamodulo theory, in: Proceedings of NordSec’07,
2007.
358 N. Bielova et al. / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 78 (2009) 340–358
[34] F. Massacci, I. Siahaan, Simulating midlet’s security claims with automata modulo theory, Proceedings of the Workshop on Programming Languages
and Analysis for Security, ACM Press, 2008, pp. 1–9.
[35] B. Meyer, Object Oriented Software Construction, second ed., Prentice Hall, 1997.
[36] J.R. Michener, T. Acar, Managing System and Active-Content Integrity, IEEE Comput. 33 (7) (2000) 108–110.
[37] MOBIUS Project Team, Framework- and application-speciﬁc securityrequirements, Public Deliverable of EU Research Project D1.2, MOBIUS –Mobility,
Ubiquity and Security, 2006. Report available at: http://mobius.inria.fr.
[38] T. Moses, eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) version 1.0, Technical report, OASIS, 2003.
[39] G.C. Necula, Proof-carrying code, in: Proceedings of POPL ’97, ACM Press, 1997, pp. 106–119.
[40] G.C. Necula, P. Lee, The design and implementation of a certifying compiler, SIGPLAN 39 (4) (2004) 612–625.
[41] Bill Ray, Symbian signing is no protection from spyware, The Register, May 2007. Available on the web at:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/05/23/symbian_signed_spyware/.
[42] F. Schneider, Enforceable security policies, ACM Trans. Inform. System Security 3 (1) (2000) 30–50.
[43] S. Schwoon, J. Esparza, A note on on-the-ﬂy veriﬁcation algorithms, Technical Report 2004/06, University of Stuttgart, November 2004.
[44] R. Sekar, C.R. Ramakrishnan, I.V. Ramakrishnan, S.A. Smolka, Model-carrying code (MCC): a new paradigm for mobile-code security, in: NSPW ’01:
Proceedings of the 2001 Workshop on New Security Paradigms, ACM Press, 2001, pp. 23–30.
[45] R. Sekar, V.N. Venkatakrishnan, Samik Basu, Sandeep Bhatkar, Daniel C. DuVarney, Model-carrying code: a practical approach for safe execution of
untrusted applications, ACM SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev. 37 (5) (2003) 15–28.
[46] Jan Smans, Bart Jacobs, Frank Piessens, Static veriﬁcation of code access security policy compliance of .NET applications, J. Object Technol. 5 (3) (2006)
35–58.
[47] D.S. Wallach, E.W. Felten, Understanding Java stack inspection, in: Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE, 1998, pp. 52–63.
[48] D. Vanoverberghe, F. Piessens, A caller-side inline referencemonitor for an object-oriented intermediate language, in: Proceedings of the 10th IFIP
International Conference on Formal Methods for Open Object-based Distributed Systems (FMOODS’08), LNCS, 2008, pp. 240–258.
[49] D. Vanoverberghe, P. Philippaerts, L. Desmet, W. Joosen, F. Piessens, K. Naliuka, F. Massacci, A ﬂexible security architecture to support third-party
applications on mobile devices, Proceedings of the 1st ACM Computer Security Architecture Workshop, ACM Press, 2007, pp. 19–28.
[50] V.N. Venkatakrishnan, R. Peri, R. Sekar, Empowering mobile code using expressive security policies, Proceedings of the New Security Paradigms
Workshop, ACM Press, 2002, pp. 61–68.
[51] B.S. Yee, A sanctuary for mobile agents, in: J. Vitek, C.D. Jensen (Eds.), Secure Internet Programming, LNCS, 2001, pp. 261–273.
[52] A. Zobel, C. Simoni, D. Piazza, X. Nunez, D. Rodriguez, Business case and security requirements, Public Deliverable D5.1.1, EU Project S3MS, October
2006. Report available at: www.s3ms.org.
